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MANDATORY INDETERMINATE SENTENCES UNDER
DANGEROUS OFFENDER LEGISLATION
JENNIFER SOWARDt

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 17, 1996, Allan Rock, Minister of Justice and
Attorney General of Canada, and Herb Grey, Solicitor General of
Canada, announced "tough new measures" 1 to deal with dangerous
offenders. These measures were introduced in Bill C-55, which
received Royal Assent on April 15, 1997. The following comment
focuses on only one significant change to the dangerous offender
legislation. 2 As part of these measures, the new section 753(4) of the
Criminal Code removes a judge's discretion to award a determinate
sentence once an accused is found to be a dangerous offender. This
discretionary power is which existed in the former legislation
replaced with a mandatory indeterminate sentence imposed once
an offender is labelled a dangerous offender.
First, this comment briefly examines the application process
and the procedure formerly involved with the dangerous offender
provisions of the Criminal Code prior to the Amendment. 3 This will
serve to demonstrate the procedures and safeguards the courts must
follow when labelling an accused a dangerous offender.

B.A. (McGill), LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
Government of Canada, Press Release "Government Announces High-Risk
Offenders Initiative" (17 September 1996).
2 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (high risk offenders), the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act, the Criminal Records Act, the Prisons and Reformatories
Act and the Department ofthe Solicitor Genera/Act, S.C. 1997, c. C-17 [hereinafter
"the Amendment"]. This amendment partially came into force on July 3, 1997 and
the balance came into force on August 1, 1997. As of yet, there has been no litigation
on the new dangerous offender legislation.
3 The dangerous offender provisions are contained in Part XXIV of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 752-761 [hereinafter "Part XXIV"].
t
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This comment will then use two cases4 to illustrate the
expansive use the courts are making of the dangerous offender
legislation.
After a discussion of the purpose of the amendment, this
comment turns to an examination of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms5 and the potential for new Charter challenges arising
from the amendment. An expansive use of Part XXIV coupled with
the mandatory indefinite sentence could result in the violation of an
accused's Charter rights. It is likely that the courts will find a
violation of section 7 of the Charter based on the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in R. v. Heywood. 6
Subsequently, this comment analyzes the Supreme Court's past
reasoning on certain issues with respect to section 7 and section 12
Charter challenges. The issues considered include the reliance of the
courts on unreliable psychiatric evidence and faulty procedural
safeguards. The discussion involves looking at how the Court has
justified Part XXIV of the Criminal Code in the past and how some
of these justifications may no longer be available since the passage
of the amendment.
The final section provides recommendations to address the real
dangers of a mandatory indeterminate sentence and possible
opportunitities for new Charter challenges.

II. DANGEROUS OFFENDER DETERMINATIONS
UNDER THE FORMER PROVISIONS

The provisions in Part XXIV of the Code prior to the Amendment
provide an extraordinary remedy for a specific class of criminals.
Dangerous offenders are considered a "small minority of offenders
who are not specifically deterred or reformed by ordinary
punishment and who pose a serious risk to the mental or physical

4 R. v. Neve (1995), 160 AR. 255 (QB.) [hereinafter Neve] and R. v. Gaudry
(1996), 186 AR. 91 (Prov. Ct) [hereinafter Gaud1y].
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the

Charter].
6

[1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 [hereinafter Heywood].
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well-being of other members of society. "7 It is important to
understand the requirements and the procedure used under the
former legislation to label an accused a dangerous offender in order
to appreciate the impact of the Amendment.
An old dangerous offender application had four main aspects.
First, the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused had been convicted of a "serious personal injury offence"
which was appropriately linked to the type of "dangerousness" the
Crown intended to prove. Second, "dangerousness" had to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the requirements listed
in section 753. Third, the court had to determine whether the
accused was a dangerous offender based primarily on the
psychiatric evidence presented to the court during the course of the
hearing without regard to the probability of a cure. The court did
have the discretion to refuse to designate an offender as dangerous,
even in circumstances where all of the psychiatric criteria were met. 8
Finally, the court had to decide whether a determinate or
indeterminate sentence would be imposed.
As is still the case following the amendment, these accused had
to be found guilty of an offence defined as a "serious personal
injury offence" in section 752 of the Code. 9 These offences can be
one of two types: one, an indictable offence (other than murder or
treason) with a maximum prison sentence of ten years or more
where there is the use or attempted use of violence against another
person, or conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or
safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe
psychological damage upon another person; or two, an offence or
attempt to commit an offence under sections 271 (sexual assault),
272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or
causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault).
Only after the accused had been found guilty of one of the
offences mentioned above could an application be made by the
Crown to have the offender labelled "dangerous"; again, this is still

7

W. N. Renke, "Case Comment: Lisa Neve, Dangerous Offender" (1995) 33
Alta. L. Rev. 650 at 654.
8 R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at 328.
9 Criminal Code s.753(1)(a).
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the case with the enactment of the amendment. However, the
application had to be made before the offender was sentenced.10
The third stage of the application process involved, and still
does, the Crown proving beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental
well-being of other persons" on the basis of evidence proving:
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of
which the offence for which he has been convicted forms
a part, showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a
likelihood of his causing death or injury to other persons,
or inflicting severe psychological damage on other
persons, through failure in the future to restrain his
behaviour,

(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the
offender, of which the offence for which he has been
convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of
indifference on the part of the offender respecting the
reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of
his behaviour, or
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the
offence for which he has been convicted, that is of such a
brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that his
behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by
normal standards of behavioural restraint. 11
The fourth stage of the process under the previous dangerous
offender legislation involved consideration of whether a
determinate or indeterminate sentence would be awarded to an
offender labelled "dangerous". The court was to look at several
factors including the protection of the public, the possibility of
recidivism, and the possibility of cure and treatment, and was to
base its final decision on the evidence put before it during the
course of the hearing. The process involved balancing the protection
of the public with the offender's individual circumstances. This is
no longer the case with the introduction of the Amendment. Now,

10 Criminal Code, s.753(2). This section allows the Crown to file an application
up to six months after the imposition of the sentence.
11 Criminal Code, s.753 (a)(i)-(iii).
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a court must impose an indeterminate sentence once an offender
has been labelled "dangerous". 12
As a result of the severity of the punishment under the old
dangerous offender legislation, there were several procedural
safeguards set up within the system to protect the accused. For
example, section 754 required the Attorney General of the province
to approve the application, and the offender had to be given seven
days notice of the dangerous offender application. This safeguard
was left untouched by the amendment. In addition, two
psychiatrists were appointed pursuant to section 755 to evaluate the
offender; one was chosen by the Crown and one by the offender .13
Another safeguard involved a statutory right of appeal available
under section 759 against the sentence handed down (i.e. an
indeterminate detention), but not the finding of "dangerousness". 14
Finally, for those offenders found to be "dangerous" and
incarcerated indefinitely, section 761 provided a parole eligibility
review every two years after three years of incarceration had been
served. 15
In summary, the current and former legislation concerning
dangerous offenders is drafted broadly and is therefore open to
inconsistent application. The most significant change from the old
procedure is the removal of the court's discretion to choose the
sentence it saw fit. Formerly, when the accused was labelled
"dangerous", the court had to then balance the interests of society
and the individual offender in determining an appropriate sentence.
The trend in the case law is towards an expansive use of the courts
powers to declare an accused a dangerous offender.

12

Criminal Code, s.753(4).

!3 This

section was replaced bys. 757 which allows the offender, with the court's
permission, to tender evidence as to his or her character and reputation.
Furthermore, s. 755 has been amended bys. 752.1(1) which limits the psychiatric
assessment. It dictates that the court may order a psychiatric assessment to be done by
one psychiatrist (or expert) as selected by the court. Clearly, this presents a host of
other problems.
14 R. v. Langevin (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 705 at 710 (C.A.). This is amended now as a
result of the news. 759(1) and again gives rise to potential litigation.
!5 This section was also repealed and replaced bys. 761 (1) so that the first review
is seven years after initial incarceration as opposed to three years.
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III. How THE COURTS EXPANDED THE USE OF
THE FORMER PROVISIONS

Between 1977 and 1995, there have been approximately 176
successful dangerous offender applications under the former
legislation. 16 The question that naturally arises is why a successful
application is brought against one offender and not another? One
possible answer is that "the label of dangerousness is a political
choice. It is a reflection of the degree to which we are willing to
infringe on the liberty of others for the benefit of society as a
whole." 17 In other words, since a court has the discretion to label an
accused dangerous, the definition of "dangerous" tends to reflect
society's or a particular decision maker's beliefs and experiences.
For example, the Supreme Court of Canada had at one point used
earlier forms of the dangerous offender legislation to label
consensual homosexual activity as "dangerous". 18 This clearly
illustrates the breadth of discretion that was given to courts under
the former legislation.
The case of R. v. Neve 19 is an interesting example of a court
interpreting the dangerous offender provisions broadly. The
accused's crime was probably not one against which the provisions
of Part XXIV were originally intended to be used. How then, did
the court decide the accused was dangerous?
In Lisa Neve's hearing, the judge chose to interpret the evidence
of Lisa's entire criminal past, including her criminal records, Alberta
Hospital records, young offender centre records, and written
documents, as supporting the notion that Neve was both a
"psychopath" and "male lust murderer". 20 The first problem with
the characterization as a "male lust murderer" is the fact that she
was never convicted of, or even charged with, murder. The
dangerous offender application made against the 22-year old was a
result of her conviction for aggravated assault. Despite the fact that
over the course of her life, she was charged a number of times for
offences such as break and enter, uttering threats and assault with a
weapon, there were never any "serious personal injury offences"
16

Supra note 7.
I. Gram, "Dangerous Offenders" (1985) 9 Dalhousie L.J. 347 at 368.
lS Klippertv. R., [1967] S.C.R. 822.
19 Supra note 4.
20 Supra note 7 at 669.
l7
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committed as defined in section 752 of the Code. Murray ].'s
comparison to a murderer is believed to be based on the following
line of reasoning: "a murderer would be dangerous, Neve is the
equivalent of a murderer, therefore Neve is dangerous." 21 This is
significant as it shows the Judge in this particular dangerous
offender hearing is basing his decision on a false premise, instead of
the facts presented to him, to find the accused "dangerous".
The second problem with finding Neve a "psychopath" and
"male lust murderer" is the fact that neither of these terms are
diagnostic terms according to the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 22
nor are they considered to be necessary conditions of
"dangerousness". Essentially, the Court here is accepting psychiatric
terms which are not even accurate. Such a lack of scientific
recognition "casts doubt on the appropriateness of the use of
[psychological terms] in a legal setting, where the liberty of the
offender-indeed the rest of the life of the offender-depends on
accuracy. " 23
Renke, clearly sees the potential dangers of this legislation being
used to catch the wrong offenders: "Neve should've been punished
as an ordinary offender, not as one of the special, small criminal
class the dangerous offender provisions were designed to control." 24
When comparing Neve's conduct with that of other offenders
who have been labelled "dangerous" by courts, this particular
dangerous offender hearing becomes even more of an anomaly. For
example, some accused have been found to be dangerous offenders
based on convictions for the following: indecent assault, attempted
rape, and rape. 25 As well, accused have been declared dangerous
offenders where they have been convicted of numerous sexual
offences involving young girls over a twelve year period, 26 nine
counts of indecent assault and ten counts of sexual assault upon
nineteen different children over a period of fifteen years involving

Supra note 7 at 671.
4ed. (Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
23 Supra note 7 at 672.
24 Supra note 7 at 676.
25 R. v. Gustavson (1982), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 491 (B.C.S.C.).
26 R. v.]ones(l994), 30 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
21

22
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children ranging in age from six to fifteen. 27 Such examples hardly
compare to Lisa Neve's one charge of aggravated assault.
The Neve case simply illustrates the problem with a court's
ability to find "dangerousness" at their discretion One hypothesis
is that the courts are simply lowering the "dangerousness" threshold
for women because they are not as likely to commit serious and
heinous crimes in the same numbers as men. If this is the case, it
demonstrates how broad and expansive the powers granted to the
courts under the dangerous offender legislation actually are. The
concern is that a court may incarcerate someone indeterminately
based on false premises, extraneous facts and unrecognized terms.
Nevertheless, the expansive use of the dangerous offender
legislation may in fact be desirable. For example, an Alberta
Provincial Court judge in R. v. Gaudry recently found a chronic
wife-beater to be a dangerous offender. Gaudry, however can be
contrasted with Neve since there was a history of repeated violent
behaviour and thirtyseven domestic-violence convictions since 1981,
including ten in eight years against the accused's common-law wife.
It was even noted by the Court that dangerous offender
proceedings are generally reserved for murderers, rapists and
paedophiles, but that courts "must clearly recognize" the effects of
long-term domestic abuse. 28 Justice Chisholm explained that he was
satisfied, in a case such as this, that the provisions of the Code are
"available to deal with an individual whose behaviour toward
another, in a domestic context, is such that the entire relationship is
comprised of long-term, repetitive acts of violence." 29 Few would
argue that the expansive use of the court's discretion in Gaudry was
undesirable. It is a reflection of society's need to deal effectively
with domestic violence. However, there is still concern that the
same discretion may be used against an accused not so deserving.
The key element in both cases is the broad use of the former
legislation by the courts when applying their discretion to label
offenders "dangerous". Arguably, courts are using the dangerous
offender legislation to catch individuals that the original legislation
may not have intended to catch. According to at least one
R. v. Noyes (1986), 6 B.C.L.R. (2d) 306 (S.C.C.).
B. Daisley, "Chronic Wife Abuser Declared Dangerous Offender" The
Lawyers Weekl,yi (20 September 1996) 3.
29 Ibid
27
28
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commentator, however, the legislation was broad enough and
should have simply been used with caution. 30 It was significant that
in the former legislation, the court's wide discretion to label
offenders was coupled with the option of sentencing the offender to
a definite period of time. As a result of the amendment, a court no
longer has this option. Instead, an indefinite sentence is required if
the offender is found to be a dangerous offender. Thus, there is a
danger that mandatory indefinite sentences coupled with an
expansive use of the dangerous offender legislation would cast the
net too wide, resulting in the courts catching offenders who do not
necessarily deserve to be locked up indefinitely.

IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENT
Minister Allan Rock described the purpose of this amendment to
be the promotion of community safety. He stated "[in] bringing
forward these measures to control high-risk offenders, we
are ... making more progress on our Safe Homes Safe Streets
Agenda. These measures will enhance public safety in this
country... ".31 In other words, the imposition of a mandatory
indeterminate sentence as per section 753(4) is an effective means
of promoting long term protection of the public.
This assertion is problematic. As illustrated, the expansive use
of the former legislation coupled with the mandatory indefinite
sentence may have resulted in the violation of an offender's Charter
rights. With this amendment, there may be new possible Charter
challenges because of overbreadth, the court's reliance on unreliable
psychiatric evidence, the lack of discretion for the court to tailor a
sentence, and the court's reliance on faulty procedural safeguards. It
must be noted that the potential problems with this amendment, as
outlined in this comment, are based on the assumption that the
courts will still use the dangerous offender legislation in an
expansive manner in labelling an offender "dangerous". However, if
this assumption is false, the practical effect of the amendment may
be that courts will simply label fewer offenders "dangerous" because
an automatic indeterminate sentence would be an inappropriate

30

31

Supra note 7 at 663.
Supra note 1.
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punishment for particular offenders. In turn, the purpose of the
amendment may be defeated because less offenders would be
found "dangerous" who may have otherwise been given this label
under the old Part XXIV of the Criminal Code.

V. MANDATORY INDETERMINATE SENTENCES SECTION 7 VIOLATION?
1. Overbreadth
As of 1987, at least eight Charter challenges to the former
dangerous offender provisions have been intiated. All have failed
miserably.32 However, there appears to be potential for a new
section 7 Charter argument of overbreadth since, under the new
amendment the discretion of the court is removed and judges are
forced to sentence all persons labelled dangerous offenders
indeterminately as prescribed by section 753 (4). Overbreadth is
argued when the measures prescribed by law are too sweeping in
relation to the objective of the legislation. By removing the
discretion to issue a determinate sentence, there is a threat of
catching persons in the net who do not deserve to be incarcerated
for an indefinite period of time.
That the legislation could have this effect is easily understood
when one examines the thought process behind its implementation.
Legislators determine the worst case scenario and work from that
perspective, whereas the courts come up with the most sympathetic
case and work from that end; legislators intervene for the political
purpose of articulating public condemnation of specific crimes and
courts are uniquely concerned with exceptional cases. 33 The courts
therefore act as a check on the Legislature. It is the courts that are
concerned with the individual and his or her special circumstances,
not the Legislature. Moreover, it is the courts that interpret
legislation when looking at its effect on the individual and have the
power to decide what will stand and what will fall.
32 R. M. Gordon & S. M. Verdun-Jones, "The Trials of Mental Health Law:
Recent Trends and Developments in Canadian Mental Health Jurisprudence"
(1987) 11 Dalhousie L.J. 833 at 853.
33 K. Roach, "Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Policy
and Reform" (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433 at 454.
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In Heywood, the Supreme Court of Canada held that,
"reviewing legislation for overbreadth as a principle of fundamental
justice is simply an example of the balancing of the State interest
against that of the individual."34 Although Heywood was not a
dangerous offender case, the concerns with respect to overbreadth
are applicable to an analysis of section 753(4). The issue in Heywood
concerned. 179 ( 1) (b) of the Criminal Code, which made it illegal
for convicted sex offenders to loiter "in or near a school ground,
playground, public park or bathing area. "35 The Court found that
this provision restricted liberty far more than was necessary to
accomplish its goal: to control the impulses of the potential reoffender and to protect the public. As a result, the section was
struck down.
With the introduction of the amendent to the dangerous
offender legislation, the court is only able to balance the interests of
the public and that of the individual when deciding if the offender
was "dangerous'', as opposed to during the sentencing stage under
the old legislation. Once again, this amendment combined with the
continued expansive use of Part XXIV, could result in the courts
labelling too many offenders "dangerous" and incarcerating people
indeterminately that do not deserve such a punishment.
Before the enactment of this amendment, the court decided
whether an offender labelled as dangerous could be ameliorated
within a determinate amount of time. If so, the determinate
sentence was appropriate; if not, an indeterminate sentence was
warranted.36 This method of sentencing is no longer an option. The
court is not able to give any real weight to the possibility of

34 Supra note 6 at 776.
35

Supra note 3.

36 Supra note 4 at 664. See R. v. Oliver (1997), 193 AR. 241 at 247 (Alta. CA).
Here the court held that the trial judge did not err by finding the appellant to be a
dangerous offender, however did err by not considering whether a determinate
sentence would be appropriate. Hunt, JA, stated, "[the trial judge] imposed an
indeterminate sentence without appreciating that he had the discretion to impose a
determinate sentence". In addition to this case, the court in R v. Hamilton (LJ)
(1996), 463 A.P.R. 38 at 46 (N.B.C.A.) affirmed the trial judge's recognition of the
fact that "[t]he legislation provides that an indeterminate sentence does not
automatically follow such declaration, as there remains a residual discretion ... to
impose a fixed term of imprisonment."
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rehabilitation and the purpose of sentencing has become strictly the
protection of the public and retribution for crimes committed.
Nonetheless, because of the nature of the crimes and the
public's desire to punish these kinds of offenders, there is still a
window of opportunity for the court to distinguish Heywood from
the situation which can arise under the dangerous offender
provisions. First, the impugned provision in Heywood created an
offence, whereas the dangerous offender legislation has clearly been
categorized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a sentencing
scheme.37 In Lyons, Laforest J. held, for the majority, that as this
legislation deals only with sentencing, the substantive features are
consistent with section? of the Charter because of the valid
penological aim (i.e. protection of the public).38 This was affirmed
in later cases by the Supreme Court of Canada39 and seems to be
the Court's method of justifying this kind of legislation. The Court
simply argues that the notions of fundamental justice are not to be
taken as seriously in the sentencing context as in the determination
of guilt or innocence.4°
Another way for the court to distinguish Heywood and uphold
the validity of mandatory indeterminate sentences would be to
follow the court in Lyons and argue that "[Parliament] has made a
diligent attempt to carefully define a very small group of offenders
whose personal characteristics and particular circumstances militate
strenuously in favour of preventive incarceration." 41 In other words,
unlike the provision in Heywood, the dangerous offender legislation
is not overbroad with respect to the group to whom it applies.
However, this argument is not as strong as the first one,
especially if one refers back to the Neve and Gaudry cases. Both
cases demonstrate how the former legislation was being extended
to catch people it was not originally intended to catch. Therefore,
for a court to justify mandatory indeterminate sentencing by
arguing that Part XXIV carefully defines a group is inherently
problematic: this group of offenders is not clearly defined. The
37
38

Supra note 8.
Supra note 8 at 325.

39 See also R. v. Jones (1994), 30 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
40

E. Colvin & T. Quigley, "Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: the
1987-88 Term" (1989) 11 Supreme Court LR. 165.
41 Supra note 8 at 339.
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government's attempt to protect the public is desirable. N everthe
less, the Charter requires that it must not be at the expense of those
who do not deserve indeterminate sentences.

2. Unreliable Psychiatric Evidence
There were numerous problems with relying on psychiatric
evidence in a dangerous offender application hearing as the
legislation stood before the enactment of the current amendment.
However, as the legislation now stands, the real issue becomes: how
can anyone ever feel morally certain as to the future likelihood of
"dangerousness" beyond a reasonable doubt and jail an accused
indefinitely based on unreliable evidence? "We must ask ourselves
whether society has the right to act upon a guess - and a highly
inaccurate one at that - when such an intrusive means of social
control as denial of liberty is involved." 42
In the past, offenders have argued that their section 7 rights
were violated because "evidence as to the future threat to society or
dangerousness is so inherently speculative that it violates the aspect
of fundamental justice that evidence to be admissible must have
some probative (i.e. relevant or logical) value."43 The evidence
referred to here is of course the psychiatric assessments of the
accused that are required for the dangerous offender hearing. In R.
v. Langevin, the court countered this argument by stating that,
"while the unreliability studies may affect the weight of psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness, they do not affect the
admissibility of such evidence." 44
The first problem with this logic is that as soon as an application
is made by the Crown, the court's perception of the offender
changes and there is more of a likelihood to rely on what "experts"
say with respect to the offender's personality and character.45 This
can lead to the problem of over-prediction. Some studies suggest
that once someone has been labelled by a psychiatrist, or some
other kind of "expert", as "dangerous", courts and review boards
tend to err on the side of caution and keep the offender in prison,

J. F. Klein, 'The Dangerousness of Dangerous Offender Legislation" (1976)
18 Can.]. of Crim. & Corr. 109 at 115.
43 Moore v. R. (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 3 at 7 (H.C.).
44 (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 705 at 723 (C.A.).
45 Supra note 43 at 112.
42
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rather than let him or her out and risk having the offender commit
another crime. 46 One statistic revealed that in order for the courts
to confine ten dangerous persons, they would have to confine
between 20 and 1000 non-dangerous offenders. 47 This seems to go
against the trite but basic tenet of the Canadian criminal justice
system: it is better to let ten guilty persons go free, than imprison
one innocent person.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the courts rely on
the procedural protection provided by the Parole Board to justify
this legislation and dismiss a section 7 violation. 48 It is believed that
the existence of a Parole Board review every two years, and
consequently the opportunity for release, protects the offender
from a section 7 breach. However, the Parole Board is relying on
this same unreliable psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness
when making their decisions. 49 Once labelled a dangerous offender,
the onus shifts to the offender to establish that he or she is no
longer a threat to society. This is an extremely difficult task in the
prison environment. It is not only a problem because of the weight
that a label from an "expert" psychiatrist carries with it, but some
commentators have suggested that reviews by the Parole Board
actually aggravate the situation and enhance the offender's hostility
towards the institution.so It is argued that to go through "a process
46 See L. ]. Chapman & J. P. Chapman, "Genesis of Popular but Erroneous
Psychodiagnostic Observation" (1967) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 72 at 193204.
47 Supra note 17 at 364.
48 Supra note 39 at 3.
49 Supra note 33 at 855. See also: R. v. Yanoshewski (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 512
at 525 (Sask. CA.) where the court expressed its concern about this very problem:
"the mere labelling of offenders as dangerous offenders makes it practically
impossible for them to get parole because of the extreme adverse reaction which
would arise should they reoffend while on parole; that dangerous offenders with
indeterminate sentences are given low priority for treatment because they are seen
in the system as long-term prisoners; that the result of all this is that dangerous
offenders serving indeterminate sentences are very seldom released on parole. In
short, it is said, the system is not working as it was intended to work. ..it imposes
what usually amounts to life imprisonment."
so Supra note 17 at 359. See also: R. v. Oliver (1997), 193 A.R. 241 at 247
(Alta.CA.) where Hunt J.A. expressed his concern about relying on the system's
effectiveness," I have deep concerns ... that a person of the appellant's relatively low
level of intelligence will not, with an indeterminate sentence, receive the kind of
attention he requires within the prison system."
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repeatedly that inevitably results in failure is devastating m any
context; but even worse when one is incarcerated."5 1
Another problem with the reliance on psychiatric evidence is
that labelling an offender "dangerous" tends to become a selffulfilling prophecy. Klein has suggested that psychiatric labelling is
largely an outcome of the setting in which the patient is seen, the
social class of the patient, and the biasing effect of other clinicians'
diagnoses.52 As soon as a label is attached, all of the offender's
behaviour is seen as a function of that label. If the offender protests,
it is seen as a problem with the offender rather than with the
system.53
This could have been one of the factors working against Lisa
Neve. The Court in that case relied on a statement from Emery
Ewanyshyn, her supervisor at the Calgary Young Offenders'
Centre, who testified that Neve was "the most dangerous inmate of
either gender. "54 Perhaps the court gave too much weight to this
person's assessment of Neve's personality and the link to
"dangerousness"; or, maybe since Neve was already in the system,
no matter what her actions, her behaviour would be interpreted in a
certain way.
There are also basic problems with the criteria used by
psychiatrists to label someone a dangerous offender as evidenced by
the blurry labels given to Lisa Neve. Psychiatrists often work from
lists of factors that are supposed to be predictive devices. Some of
the factors on the list may include: brutality sustained in childhood;
bedwetting, firesetting, and cruelty to animals; assorted delinquent
acts during puberty; lack of concern for the victim; explosive
outbursts; high I.Q.; loneliness; and excessive truancy.55 It is clear
from this list that such criteria are not necessarily reliable indicators
of dangerous offenders. These characteristics or experiences may
also be found in non-violent persons with emotional problems. This
Supra note 17 at 359.
Supra note 42 at 112.
53 Supra note 17 at 366.
54 Supra note 7 at 653.
55 Supra note 17 at 362. See also J. Bonta et al., The Crown Files Research
Project: A Study of Dangerous Offenders (Solicitor General of Canada, 1996) at 16,
where a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder was the highest ranked
predictor of "dangerousness" by the twenty-one Crown Attorneys interviewed for
this survey.
5I
52
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is where the critique arises: how does anyone know which
characteristics are signs of dangerousness and which ones are not?
Furthermore, how many factors on the list have to be present to
make someone dangerous and who decides? Klein's article outlines
three issues which explain why the designation of someone as
"dangerous" is inaccurate and unreliable: (1) there is no agreed
upon definition of dangerousness; (2) there is no provision made in
psychiatric nosology upon which to base such a prediction; and (3)
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists receive no special training to
equip them to make such predictions.56 This list is not exhaustive,
but illustrates the essence of the problem: how can a court
incarcerate someone indefinitely based on this kind of illusive
criteria?
Even before the Charter, there was criticism regarding the use of
psychiatrists as agents of social control. Ericson wrote that:
Just as the student health service of a university should
have no direct influence on a student's ability to stay in
and graduate from an academic program, so a
penitentiary health service should play no direct role in
the institutional program and release decisions affecting
the inmate. 57

Psychiatrists and psychologists themselves have gone to great
lengths to discredit themselves as accurate sources for the
prediction of dangerous behaviour. In 1969, the Report on the
Canadian Committee on Corrections blatantly admitted that "many
Dangerous Sexual Offenders have been wrongly classified as such
and that an extensive rescreening and reappraisal of the people in
this category might result in the reclassification and possible earlier

56 Supra note 42 at 113. See also ]. Bonta et al., supra note 55 at 24 where the
survey explains the various ways of diagnosing an Antisocial Personality Disorder
and the way the results differ depending on the test used: "When relying on DSMIV criteria and psychiatric judgement, the incidence of an Antisocial Personality
Disorder appears no different from that found in general offender population.
However, the incidence of Clinical Psychopathy as measured by the PCL-R was
almost double the rate found in forensic and correctional populations." This
illustrates the dangers in relying on this kind of evidence to sentence someone
indeterminately.
57 R. V. Ericson, "Penal Psychiatry in Canada: The Method of Our Madness"
(1976) 26 U ofT L.J. 17 at 27.
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discharge."58 Some commentators claim that "the most accuracy
that can be reached with predictions of dangerousness to date is
50%."59
Dangerousness is not an objective concept that can be easily
defined; it is a matter of judgment or opinion, there is no
psychological or medical entity as a "dangerous" person-it is a
question of what society is prepared to endure. 60 As demonstrated
by the Neve hearing, a court can and will rely on this kind of
questionable evidence when it wants to label an offender
"dangerous". Despite the evidence that the prediction of
"dangerousness" or the "likelihood of dangerousness" by
psychiatrists and other experts is clearly fallible, section 7 challenges
on this point have failed in the past.
The courts must be forced to ask how many "false positive"
predictions are justified for the social benefits derived from the
"true positive prediction" without violating an offender's section 7
right under the Charter. 61 This is an especially significant question
in light of the new amendment. The unreliability of diagnostic
evidence becomes even more serious as a result of the automatic
indeterminate sentences that follow from the label of "dangerous".
Again this is based on the assumption that the courts will continue
to take an expansive approach to the use of Part XXIV even now
that indeterminate sentences are mandatory.

VI. MANDATORY INDETERMINATE SENTENCESSECTION 12 VIOLATION?

1. Discretion to Tailor the Sentence
It appears from an examination of the case law that an offender's
best option is to argue mandatory indefinite sentence is a violation
of section 12 Charter rights. Of course, this statement does not take
58

Oirnet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1969) at 17.
59 C. P. Ewing, "Preventive Detention and Execution, The Constitutionality of
Punishing Future Crimes" (1991) 12 A.J.I.L. at 143.
60 J. Floud, "Dangerousness and Criminal Justice" (1982) 22 British Journal of
Criminology 213.
61 M. Manning, "Lyons: A One-Stage Approach to the Charter and Undue
'Constitutional Notice"' (1988) 61 C.R. (3d) 72.
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into consideration the reality of the situation; namely, that most
offenders lack sufficient resources to pursue a Charter challenge.
In R. v. Gustavson the court's dismissal of a section 12 violation
was expressly premised on the fact that the judge in a dangerous
offender hearing had the discretion to tailor the sentence to fit the
particular offender. The majority held that:
[No] two dangerous offenders are precisely alike, nor are
their offences. That truth carries over to offenders and
offences of every sort. Save when supplied with a
mandatory penalty, every judge is left with the task of
making the penalty fit the crime, and [the judge's]
reasons will be closely confined to the particular facts of
each case. A judge must ponder individual circumstances
on his way to finding a fitting sentence for each case.
That mental process is a vital part of the exercise of
judicial discretion. 62

It is suggested that the courts do not prefer mandatory
sentences because they do not allow for an examination of the
offender's individual circumstances. As a result of the court's
inability to tailor a sentence, the offender becomes an "abstraction"
and is not considered in his or her contingent particularities. 63 In R.
v. Smith, Lamer J. (as he then was), for the majority, expounded a
test which reflected the same dislike for mandatory sentences. 64
Although Smith did not involve a dangerous offender hearing, the
principles set out in the case with respect to sentencing and section
12 violations are still relevant.
The mandatory indeterminate sentence required by the
amended dangerous offender legislation completely eliminates the
court's opportunity to tailor a sentence to the offender based on his
62 (1982), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 491 at 495 (B.C.S.C.). See R v. Lyons supra note 8 at
341, where Justice Laforest expressed the same kind of sentiment: "In my opinion,
if the sentence imposed under Part [XXIV] was indeterminate, simpliciter, it would
be certain, at least occasionally, to result in sentences grossly disproportionate to
what individual offenders deserved."
63 K. Roach, "Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Policy
and Reform" (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433 at 442. See also: R. v. Yanoshewski (1996), 104
C.C.C. (3d) 512 at 526 (Sask. C.A) where the court held, "the indeterminate
sentence will usually be used as a last resort where the usual sentences and programs
of treatment and rehabilitation have been tried and failed ... ".
64 [1987] l S.C.R. 1045 at 1072-74.
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or her particular problems and needs. As a result, under Chief
Justice Lamer's "effects test": "individuals caught in guidelines
which ignore or devalue their own particular mitigating
circumstances could raise constitutional claims of disproportionality
in their defence." 65 It was held that a sentence would be considered
unconstitutional if it "is so unfit having regard to the offence and
the offender."66
Furthermore the Court in R. v. Noyes held that: "providing for a
sentence that is indeterminate, a sentence that never ends ... [that]
imposes a cruel and unusual punishment that is disproportionate to
any crime or situation contemplated [regardless of the purpose of
the legislation]. "67 This is clearly a positive statement by the court
for a dangerous offender willing to challenge the amendment in the
Code. However, there must be more than just disproportionality for
an offender to successfully challenge section 12 of the Charter.
The test as outlined by the Court in R. v. Smith was "one of
gross disproportionality, because it is aimed at punishments that are
more than merely excessive." 68 However, the courts could follow
the reasoning used in Lyons where the majority held that "grossly"
reflects the "court's concern not to hold Parliament to a standard so
exacting, at least in the context of section 12, as to require
punishment to be perfectly suited to accommodate the moral
nuances of every crime and every offender." 69 Yet, this approach is
disturbing in that it seems to dismiss the significance of the
fundamental principle that the punishment must fit the crime. Is
the Supreme Court of Canada really saying that this principle does
not apply to dangerous offenders?
It must be recognized that in the majority of these hearings,
"gross disproportionality" would probably not result from the
handing down of an indefinite sentence. Nevertheless, if the courts
continue to use the new dangerous offender legislation in an
expansive manner, there is the potential for grossly disproportionate
sentences to result from an offender being labelled "dangerous".
The assumption is that since the enactment of the amendment, the
65

Roach, supra note 63 at 451.

66 Supra note 64 at 1072.
(1986), 6 B.C.L.R. (2d) 306 at 309-10 (S.C.C.).
Supra note 64 at 1072.
69 Supra note 18 at 344-45.
67

68
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courts will not simply begin to label fewer people "dangerous"
because of the mandatory indeterminate sentence.

2. Faulty Procedural Safeguards
In the past, courts have held that there was no section 12 violation
with respect to dangerous offender legislation because of
Parliament's overall objective of protecting society and that it was
not likely that the offender would remain in custody "beyond the
period of time during which [the offender] is considered
dangerous" because the National Parole Board was charged with
making periodic reviews of a dangerous offender's detention.7°
The fact is that this two-tiered sentencing structure (i.e. the
Parole Board is there to correct any errors made by the court) was
dropped by the legislature in 1961.71 The Parole Board is there to
ensure that no injustice is done and that the offender is released
when he or she has received "the maximum benefit"n of the
incarceration. Furthermore, the Board must consider whether the
release would constitute an "undue risk" to society and must be
satisfied that the inmate's reform and rehabilitation would be aided
by release. Therefore if the accused remains "dangerous" according
to the Board's definition, this criterion remains unsatisfied.
Nonetheless, it is not the Board's duty to remove or alter the
label of dangerous. Dangerous offenders have argued that they are
less likely than other offenders to satisfy these requirements. Yet,
the Court in Lyons held that fact to be "primarily a function of their
dangerousness, not of the punishment imposed."73 This seems to be
circular reasoning on the Court's part; the only reason the offender
has been given that particular punishment is because of the
"dangerousness" label, yet it is the label which will keep the
offender in prison. As stated earlier, it is virtually impossible for an
offender once labelled "dangerous" to prove otherwise to a Parole
Board. This potential for a breakdown in the system is bound to
result in some "cruel and unusual punishment". As a result, the
Parole Board's ability to tailor a sentence seems illusory.

Supra note 44 at 731.
Supra note 17 at 372.
72 Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990) 6 W.W.R. 673 at 693 (S.C.C.).
73 Supra note 18 at 344.
70
71

MANDATORY INDETERMINATE SENTENCES

209

This was exactly the problem in Warden ofMountain Institution
v. Steele.74 In that case, Steele had pleaded guilty to a charge of
attempted rape when he was 18 and declared a "criminal sexual
psychopath". He was sentenced to indeterminate detention and the
Judge emphasized that the offender must receive proper psychiatric
treatment. After 37 years and numerous recommendations for
some form of release by medical experts, the offender still
remained behind bars. The Parole Board had repeatedly denied
parole. The Supreme Court of Canada held that Steele's
incarceration was "cruel and unusual" and had thus violated section
12 of the Charter. The important message from the Steele case is
the fact that the system is not perfect. Despite the presence of
perceived safeguards (i.e. the Parole Board), an offender can still
have his or her Charter rights violated. According to Grant, there is
a dangerous shift in authority which does not guarantee the same
kind of protection that should be afforded to the offender: "what
we have, in effect, is a delegation of the sentencing authority from
the judiciary to the Parole Board."75
It is unfair for the courts to rely strictly on this kind of illusory
procedural safeguard as a means of justifying this new legislation.
However, the Court in R. v. Moore went even further by holding
that the proceedings of the National Parole Board are subject to
judicial review.76 In that case, it appearst that a possible violation of
an offender's rights is allowed because farther down the
administrative line, if the offender wants, he or she can try and have
the Parole Board's decision judicially reviewed. This clearly shows
the lengths the courts will go to avoid finding a Charter violation
with respect to dangerous offender legislation.
According to Lamer J. (as he then was), and the majority in
Smith, another aspect of a section 12 inquiry involves looking at the
way in which the effects of punishment are likely to be
experienced. 77 The seriously detrimental effects of an indeterminate
sentence on an offender are discussed in Grant's article:
The dangerous offender is already the lowest of the low
in the prison hierarchy; if he is a sexual offender, as most
Supra note 72 at 1385.
75 Supra note 17 at 358.

74
76

77

(1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 3 at 5 (H.C.).
Supra note 64 at 1072.
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dangerous offenders are, he faces constant abuse and
even threats to his life from the other inmates. It is not
surprising that if and when a dangerous offender does
get out, his anger and sense of persecution could add to
an already violent potential. The system perpetuates
violence, it does not alleviate it.78
According to a 1985 study, most dangerous offenders were in
protective custody, segregation or in institutions with protective
custody facilities.7 9 An indeterminate sentence saps the will of an
offender, removing any incentive to rehabilitate himself or herself as
a result of there being no apparent end in sight. In R. v. Oliver, the
defence psychiatrist, testified that those sentenced to indeterminate
sentences, "often get lost in the shuffle in a correctional setting and,
that, as a result, such individuals sometimes lose motivation for
being treated ... persons with indeterminate sentences receive the
least priority for treatment." 80 It is the parole process that is
supposed to be the factor capable of providing the convicted
offender with that "end in sight" by "truly accommodating and
tailoring the sentence to fit the circumstances of the individual
offender." 81 However, courts should clearly not rely on the illusory
effect of the Parole Board as a procedural safeguard as it has in the
past in order to save the legislation. 82
Once again, section 12 appears to be the offender's best chance
at establishing a Charter violation if given a mandatory
indeterminate sentence as required by section 753(4) of the Code.
However, the reality is that a sentence will violate section 12 only in
"rare and unique" cases: "The test for determining whether a
sentence is disproportionately long is very properly stringent and
demanding. A lesser test would tend to trivialize the Charter. "83
This unfortunately gives the court a generous opportunity to not

Supra note 17 at 367.
Jakimiec, F. Porporino, S. Addario & C.D. Webster, "Dangerous Offenders
in Canada, 1977-85" (1986) 9 lnt'lJ.L. & Psy. 479 at 485.
80 Supra note 36 at 247.
81 Supra note 8 at 341.
82 See R v. Lyons, supra note 8 at 341. After saying that across the board
indeterminate sentencing might occasionally result in s. 12 violations, the Court
justified it by relying on the presence of procedural safeguards.
83 Supra note 72 at 697.
78

79 J.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE NEW DANGEROUS OFFENDER LEGISLATION
First and foremost, the amendment requmng mandatory
indeterminate sentences for dangerous offenders is not a good idea
and should not have been made law. The provision is overreaching
and will, for reasons stated throughout this comment, likely result
in the violation of an offender's Charter rights.
Nevertheless, since section 753(4) has come into force,
Parliament should implement stricter guidelines as to when
dangerous offender applications can be made. 84
A national list of criteria which must be met before a
dangerous offender application can be successfully made
might be sufficient. This would be an attempt to deter
any overzealous Crown Attorneys or judges and make
the procedure seem less arbitrary. This step is necessary
to avoid relying on the assumption that Crown Attorneys
are capable of recognizing dangerousness and identifying
who should and should not be labelled. 85

Second, Parliament must deal with the continued reliance of
the courts on fallible psychiatric evidence. There is a desperate need
for clear and certain definitions of "dangerousness" and
"likelihood" in order for the courts to be able to label an offender
with more accuracy. These definitions should also be based on
some kind of a national standard, not just on a judge's or
psychiatrist's
own personal views
of what
constitutes
"dangerousness" or a "likelihood" of repeating violent behaviour.
Finally, the legislation should shift the onus of establishing
continued dangerousness onto the Crown for the purposes of a
84 See also J. Bonta supra note 55 at 2 where the twenty-one Crown Attorneys
interviewed overwhelmingly endorsed the dangerous offender legislation as it was
prior to the amendment of the Criminal Code. The message was clear that, rather
than replacing the dangerous offender legislation, the Crown saw a need to make
improvements to the existing legislation as well as the policies and procedures
supporting its application.
85 Ibid. at 47.
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Parole Board hearing. Based on the problems discussed earlier in
this comment, it is unfair that the accused must convince the Parole
Board that her or she is no longer dangerous.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is a perception in Canada that public safety is in jeopardy
and that community and victim needs are being overlooked by the
government in favour of offenders' rights. The problem is that
society's fears are often exaggerated by extensive, highly
sensationalized news coverage of a very small number of postrelease offences. However, "[to] introduce laws which can be abused
in the belief that they will not be abused is not sound policy." 86
Parliament appears to have done exactly that with the introduction
of the dangerous offender amendment. 87
There will always be the "Paul Bernardos" of the world which
dearly deserve the label of "dangerous" and Part XXIV of the
Criminal Code was obviously designed to deal with those types of
offenders. However, the problem lies in the fact that a grey area of
offenders exists who should be spared this label because ordinary
criminal sentencing provisions would be more appropriate. This
large grey area combined with the courts' expansive use of their
discretion to label offenders "dangerous" and the new automatic
mandatory sentence has the potential to lead to unjust results.
Parliament should not simply implement this amendment without
amending other aspects of the criminal justice system in order to
ensure that Part XXIV is not abused. 88 Sentencing an offender to an
86 As

cited in J. Floud, supra note 60 at 225.
See also M. Jackson, "Sentencing of Dangerous and Habitual Offenders in
Canada", Federal Sentencing Reporter, vol. 9, no. 5, March/April 1997 258 at 259.
Jackson articulates the problem with the government's reaction to public pressure
when he states that notwithstanding the "recent evidence of a general decline in the
violent crime rate, such [Dangerous Offender] cases have fueled a public demand
for more preventative detention, a demand which the federal government has found
difficult to resist."
88 Jbid. at 261. Jackson illustrates a rather cynical, yet somewhat accurate, image
of the real problem with the amendment:
87

The situation [today] finds its mirror image in the seeming
inability of governments, on both sides of the 49th parallel, to
resist the political benefits which are perceived to flow from
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indeterminate period of time may very well have been justified by
the courts in the 169 successful applications, yet there have been
seven determinate sentences given under the dangerous offender
legislation that were tailored in order to reflect the individual
circumstances of the offender. 89 The courts should not be denied
the discretion to award the sentence they see fit.

criminal justice policies that redraw the precarious balance
between the state and individual freedom ... away from the
adjudication of demonstrated blameworthiness and due process
in favor of the prediction of future dangerousness and crime
control.
89

C. Schmitz, "High-risk Offenders Law Comes Under Fire" The Lawyers
Weekly, vol. 16, no. 22, (18 Oct. 1996) 1 at 14. See also R. v. Oliver, supra note 50.

